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Abstract
This paper seeks to investigate the inner mechanics of policy change. It aims to discover how
ideas enter the political arena, and how endogenous forces within the policy making environment
transform ideas into new policies. The central hypothesis is that in times of crisis, new ideas
emanate from a number of change agents, but in order for any of these ideas to enter the institutional
environment, one specific agent of change must be present: the political entrepreneur. Without
political entrepreneurs, ideational change, and subsequent policy change, would not occur. The
paper sets out a framework for identifying and explaining the endogenous drivers of policy change,
and then tests this framework on two case studies, from two countries.
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 Introduction 
 
When Sir Ralph Harris, head of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
suggested to Margaret Thatcher that the IEA had been advocating market reform 
and monetarism two decades prior to her election as Prime Minister, Thatcher 
quipped: “But remember [Ralph] while the cocks may crow, it’s the hen that lays 
the egg” (Blundell 2008, 8). This captures our paper’s hypothesis that, in the 
context of an exogenous shock (in this case a crisis in the British economy in 
1979), the political entrepreneur is the main agent of policy change. The political 
entrepreneur acts as a bridge between those developing/advocating new policy 
ideas – policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), policy networks (Pemberton 2000) 
or other change agents (Hall 1993) – and the institutions implementing them. In 
the network of actors contributing to policy change, the political entrepreneur sits 
at the centre of the process. Without a political entrepreneur to inject the new 
ideas of policy entrepreneurs into the political arena at times of crisis such as 
recessions, wars, or political instability, policy change will not occur. 
Although the concepts of political and policy entrepreneurship have 
received attention in the literature, “the concept of policy entrepreneurship is yet 
to be broadly integrated within studies of policy change” (Mintrom and Norman 
2009, 649-650). To address this lacuna, our paper examines case studies from two 
countries experiencing economic crises during the mid 1970s and early 1980s.  
Such historical cross-national studies hold considerable promise for achieving a 
conceptual breakthrough in our understanding of policy change (Mintrom and 
Norman 2009). 
 This paper initially discusses the institutional and policy change literature, 
then examines the various types of change agents before setting out the 
hypotheses for identifying policy change and testing these against the selected 
cases. The conclusion highlights the paper’s significance and limitations. 
 
 
Institutional Analysis and Explanations of Change 
 
The issue of policy change has often been addressed in political science literature 
through the concept of exogenous shocks. Crises are regularly blamed for 
destabilising polices. For instance, Greener (2001) argues that exogenous shocks 
result in new policy paradigms. As a result, the policy change literature (Collier 
and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001) has sought to perfect our identification of crises 
and critical junctures. However, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to 
the mechanics through which crises result in policy change. 
The critical junctures concept was co-opted by path dependence scholars 
as a means of accounting for change. This is akin to the use of punctuated 
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 equilibrium in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory (Gould and Eldredge 1977).  
Consequently, a regularly invoked interpretation of policy change has divided 
history into “normal periods” and “critical junctures,” during which major change 
is possible (Gorges 2001). The concepts of critical junctures and exogenous 
shocks have sometimes been reduced to a deus ex machina to explain change that 
has proved otherwise inexplicable. Thus, exogenous explanations for sudden and 
dramatic shifts in policies tend to be crude. Orren and Skowronek (1994) observe 
that punctuated equilibrium models ignore many of the characteristics of change 
and ignore endogenous characteristics of change specifically. Thus, the problem 
here seems to be the use of exogenous shocks in a deterministic fashion that 
ignores endogenous entities – constituents such as policy and political 
entrepreneurs – that respectively generate and institutionalise emergent policy 
ideas. However, without the notion of exogenous shocks to initiate the change 
process, path dependence is reduced to an equilibrium model. Yet, at a time of 
crisis, if we can look within an institution for sources of policy change, in terms 
of idea generation and idea advocacy, we can avoid the necessity of having to rely 
exclusively upon exogenous explanations for policy change.   
Crises expose decision makers to criticism and demands for more effective 
action (Walsh 2006), resulting in policy change. Yet, sometimes crises do not 
result in policy changes. What accounts for this inconsistency? Walsh (2006) 
argues that policy change is most likely to occur when an alternative policy idea 
can explain past failures and secure the support of powerful constituents.  It is to 
these powerful constituents, capable of generating and advocating alternative 
policy ideas, that we now turn.   
 
 
Agents of Change 
 
The term political entrepreneur, as an explicit concept, was developed by Dahl 
(1961) (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011).  Dahl (1961, 6) contended that the political 
entrepreneur is the crucial agent of change, and “is not so much the agent of 
others as others are his agents.” The political entrepreneur picks and chooses from 
policy ideas put forward by policy entrepreneurs at times of crisis and shapes the 
terms of political debate by influencing agendas and constructing cultural frames 
(Hwang and Powell 2005). They “exploit moments of instability” created by 
exogenous shocks and “invest resources in the creation of a new policy, or new 
forms of collective action,” having “transformative effects on politics, policies, 
and institutions” (Sheingate 2003, 188-190). 
 Kingdon (1995) suggests that change agents encompass a broad grouping 
of what he terms “policy entrepreneurs.” When a policy is in difficulty, due to an 
exogenous shock for instance, windows of opportunity appear in which policy 
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 entrepreneurs challenge the existing paradigm (Kingdon 1995). They present a 
range of new ideas to replace the ones upon which existing policy is based and in 
the process vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policy-
making environment.  Policy entrepreneurs encompass civil servants, technocrats, 
academics, economists and interest groups, etc. that engage in policy innovation 
and have some access to decision makers. 
Pemberton (2000) identifies change agents as belonging to a policy 
network schema. In this case, the policy entrepreneurs are essential for advocating 
new policy ideas to replace failing arrangements at times of crisis.  However, the 
role of the political entrepreneur willing to become an idea’s “champion” is 
crucial. The result is the creation of coalitions among a variety of policy 
entrepreneurs and the political entrepreneur, whereby “ideas facilitate the 
reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources” (Blyth 2002, 
37). Political entrepreneurs are the bridge between those advocating new policy 
ideas (policy entrepreneurs) and the institutions implementing them. As such, 
political entrepreneurs, by influencing agendas, shape the terms of political debate 
(Hwang and Powell 2005). “Successful political entrepreneurs are able to 
consolidate innovations, producing political or social change that has enduring 
effects in the form of new programs, policies, or organizations” (Hwang and 
Powell 2005, 214). This recognises leadership as a situational phenomenon, 
whereby leaders can take institutions/policies in particular directions (Wallis and 
Dollery 1997). This paper contends that, at times of exogenous shocks, policy 
entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible for producing new ideas, but 
the political entrepreneur acts as a figurehead, introducing these ideas into the 
policy process. The political entrepreneur, at the head of an entrepreneurial 
network of policy entrepreneurs, is capable of engaging in the process of creative 
destruction in relation to policy.    
 The relationship between policy and political entrepreneurs can be 
illustrated by the astronomical concept of a nebula, wherein the gravitational 
mechanics result in the clustering of particles to produce mass and eventually 
stars.  Like such particles, there are always policy entrepreneurs with policy ideas, 
swirling around in the policy making environment. In the wake of a crisis, policy 
entrepreneurs vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policy-
making arena. If a politician is willing to act as a political entrepreneur and 
champion a new idea, they can draw policy entrepreneurs and other interests to 
them, building a mass of support behind the policy idea they are advocating 
(Figure 1). There are advantages for each side in the relationship. The political 
entrepreneur benefits from the expertise of policy entrepreneurs, to say nothing of 
their support, while the latter benefit from the politician’s “patronage” of their 
idea in the corridors of power.  The more senior the political entrepreneur, and the 
more determined they are in advancing a particular policy, the greater their 
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 entrepreneurial potential (Wallis and Dollery 1997).  Thus, the process of change 
is located in the interaction of ideas, actors, and institutions (Hay 2004). 
 
 
 Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
Figure 1. The Policy Change Nebula 
 
 
Framework for the Identification of Policy Change 
 
Existing explanations of policy change, while acknowledging the role of policy 
entrepreneurs, fail to integrate the separate concepts of policy and political 
entrepreneurship into their transformative frameworks (Mintrom and Norman 
2009). This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the endogenous forces 
driving policy change, wherein the political entrepreneur, interacting with policy 
entrepreneurs, plays a crucial role. Building on the work discussed above, the 
paper hypothesizes that policy change occurs in three stages: initiation of the 
policy debate due to a crisis, ideational change, and the advent of the political 
entrepreneur. The paper seeks to help explain why, in the wake of certain crises 
and policy failures, there is policy change, while at other times of crisis no change 
occurs.  
We will measure the nature of policy change using the concepts of first-, 
second- and third-order change developed by Hall (1993). Hall (1993) argues that 
exogenous shocks and policy failures can set off processes that lead to ideational 
change, sometimes resulting in the re-examination of the belief systems through 
which extant policy has been generated. Thus, this approach provides us with a 
Third 
Order 
Policy 
Change 
Political 
Entrepreneurs 
Third 
Order 
Policy 
Change 
Policy 
Failure 
Crisis 
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 useful tool for understanding degrees of policy change. In Hall’s (1993) view, 
first order change represents a change to policy instrument settings and is a 
response to policy feedback. Whilst politicians are present in the core decision-
making network, it is policy entrepreneurs who dominate this process. Second 
order change is a change to the instruments of policy and their settings and is also 
driven by policy entrepreneurs, not politicians. In instances of both first and 
second order change, the overall goals of policy remain the unaltered.  However, 
in third order change, there is change in the instrument settings, the instruments 
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy (Hall 1993). In this case it is 
politicians, and not policy entrepreneurs, who dominate the process. “Such 
wholesale changes in policy occur relatively rarely” (Hall 1993, 279). 
 
The Initiation of the Policy Debate 
 
Crises or exogenous shocks are often cited as explanations for policy change 
(Greener 2001; Golob 2003), as their existence highlights a failing within existing 
policies due to their implication in, or inability to right, the emergent situation 
(Levy 1994). In order for policy entrepreneurs to challenge existing arrangements, 
a crisis and policy failure must be identified and widely perceived (Hay 1999).  
Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a crisis before 
collective action to resolve the resultant uncertainty can be taken (Blyth 2002).  
Agents shape “the terms of political debate: they frame issues, define problems 
and influence agendas” (Sheingate 2003, 188).  They ultimately initiate a debate 
concerning extant ideational orthodoxy. 
In terms of macroeconomic shocks, Garrett (1993, 522) suggests that 
“most scholars agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes 
possible because they render politics highly fluid.”  A crisis can call into question 
existing policies, bringing about the possibility of change (Tilly 1975).  
Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A crisis/exogenous shock will initiate debate concerning existing 
policy arrangements. 
 
Ideational Change  
 
Once a crisis is identified, the failure of a prevailing policy paradigm drives 
policymakers to look outside government for a solution (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004). Ideas influence policy by acting though particular actors who promote an 
idea and build a supporting coalition (Berman 1998).  As policy entrepreneurs are 
team players they can constitute an “entrepreneurial network,” the composition 
and size of which can demonstrate the support for an idea (Mintrom and Norman 
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 2009). The triumph of a new idea from policy entrepreneurs depends upon “a 
workable new idea being available” which a political entrepreneur is then 
prepared to promote (Oliver and Pemberton 2004, 419). Such ideas determine the 
path of subsequent policy, as policymakers work within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specify not only the goals of policy, but the instruments to be used 
to achieve these goals, and the nature of the problems they are meant to address 
(Hall 1993). 
Policy entrepreneurs function as a link between problems and the policies 
introduced by political entrepreneurs to resolve those problems. Political 
entrepreneurs co-ordinate the policy entrepreneurs, encouraging them to coalesce 
around a decipherable set of alternative ideas; they are the link between the 
innovation of the policy entrepreneurs and policy change. Thus, the political 
entrepreneurs are the drivers of creative destruction.  
According to Legro (2000), extant ideational collapse and new ideational 
consolidation are components of the ideational change process.  Should a range of 
policy entrepreneurs agree that the prevailing paradigm is inadequate, ideational 
collapse will occur (Legro 2000). In the wake of ideational collapse, the issue is 
reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. Legro (2000) argues that if consensus is 
achieved we will then see change agents co-ordinating a replacement set of ideas 
to the reigning consensus.  However, “failure to reach consensus on a replacement 
could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old 
orthodoxy” (Legro 2000, 424). Walsh (2006) sees this as the continuation of 
failed policies due to a lack of coherent intellectual links between policy tools and 
desired outcomes. In the wake of ideational collapse, a new idea will be adopted if 
an identifiable political entrepreneur is present to champion it and the idea itself is 
politically intelligible. As Thatcher suggested, the cock may crow, but there must 
be a hen to lay the egg. Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Policy failures will lead to underlying ideational collapse as policy 
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial networks) critique the current model and generate 
replacement ideas, around which they will consolidate if a political entrepreneur 
is present, resulting in ideational change. 
 
Without a political entrepreneur acting as a type of ideational 
figurehead/catalyst, this new idea will not enter the institutional environment. 
 
Policy Change 
 
Hall (1993) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, discredit the old 
paradigm, leading to a re-examination of the belief systems through which that 
policy was created. Outlined above is how Hall (1993) describes rare, but radical, 
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 and overarching changes in policy as third order changes. As we argue that 
political entrepreneurs are necessary for such paradigm shifts to occur, we are 
effectively using third order change as the threshold for evaluating the presence of 
political entrepreneurs. This is because political entrepreneurs exploit the 
uncertainty created by crises (what Blyth (2002) terms as Knightian uncertainty), 
and “search for that mix of interests and appeals that can produce a winning 
coalition” to generate major change (Sheingate 2003, 192). For new ideas to 
overthrow extant policies the political entrepreneur must occupy a position 
enabling them to challenge existing arrangements.  Political entrepreneurs can be 
leaders of the governing party or an opposition party, though Oliver (1997) 
suggests that, for a political party, a period in opposition can be conducive to 
social learning, allowing it be more open to new ideas. For an idea to triumph, 
political entrepreneurs must act as ideational coordinators, bringing a broad array 
of policy entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial network together in a coalition for 
ideational and policy change. Without a political entrepreneur to inject new ideas 
into the policy making arena, third order/paradigm change (Hall 1993) will not 
occur, as no agents within the entrepreneurial network possess the necessary 
access to existing institutional arrangements to implement such change. Instead, 
there may be a first order policy change (change to the policy instrument settings), 
or a second order policy change (change to the setting and instruments of policy).   
Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Third order (paradigmatic) policy change will result if a political 
entrepreneur injects the ideas espoused by an entrepreneurial network into the 
political environment. 
 
While policy networks constitute a particularly important intermediate variable in 
enabling policy change (Pemberton 2000), the political entrepreneur is the 
“crucial element.” 
 
 
Methods and Country Selection  
 
Comparative historical analysis has sought to provide temporally grounded 
accounts of diverse topics in the social sciences, including accounts of policy 
change. This approach is “defined by a concern with the use of systematic and 
contextualized comparison” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 3). By 
examining the nature of economic policy change at the national level in two 
countries, namely Sweden and the United States (US), this paper seeks to add to 
the extant literature, which is mostly made up of individual country examinations 
that often juxtapose different levels of policy change (Howlett and Cashore 2009). 
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  Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the beginning of the 1980s 
constitute interesting cases. Each country appeared to have reached a turning 
point in their histories at these times.  In Sweden, the years immediately following 
the oil crisis of the early 1970s were marked by both recession and stagflation as 
the economy struggled to maintain the welfare state (OECD 1978). In a context of 
declining economic competiveness, rising unemployment, and a widening budget 
deficit, there were worries that the Swedish Model of free enterprise coexisting 
with an expansive welfare state could no longer survive (Fulcher 1991; Mjoset 
1992). By the early 1980s, the US was locked in economic stagnation (Dark 
2001). Stagflation led to a deep soul searching as to the country’s economic future 
(Divine et al. 1995). There was a sense that the federal government lacked an 
understanding of how this problem might be resolved (Spulber 1995).   
 In both countries there was deep anxiety – a questioning of past decisions 
married with uncertainty as to how to proceed.  In a sense, they were experiencing 
existential angst. To many Swedes, the Swedish Model appeared unsustainable by 
the mid-1970s, while, for Americans, the central tenets of the American Dream 
seemed to have foundered.   
In addition to being selected for having reached a crossroads in their 
development, the countries were selected using a combination of most-similar and 
most different criteria. Using the most similar case selection method, the same 
independent variables are chosen; when employing the most different technique, 
dissimilar independent variables are selected (Gerring 2007). The US and Sweden 
share the overarching criteria of being long-standing democracies and capitalist 
states. The specific criteria were 1) stable democracy since the first half of the 
twentieth century and 2) founding membership of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), conditions uniting the principles of 
representative democracy and the free market. Thus, we are examining the nature 
of macroeconomic policy change within the context of different temporal 
boundaries (Gerring 2007) at the national level. These countries are most different 
according to Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual 
democracies, allowing us to control for varying institutional arrangements.  
Additionally, while the US is a federal presidential republic, Sweden is a 
constitutional monarchy. Both countries’ economies’ performances, and the 
policies governing them, varied during the 20th century.   
The similarities ensure that “the contexts of analysis are analytically 
equivalent,” while their differences place “parallel processes of change in sharp 
relief” (Collier 1997, 4). The value of such cross national studies, historical in 
context, is that they offer the prospect of conceptual breakthroughs in our 
understanding of policy change (Lieberman 2001). 
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 Evaluation and Discussion 
 
Sweden, 1976 
 
The Economic Crisis. By the 1970s, Sweden was straining under the burden of 
supporting its welfare state (Time 1976a). Increased international competition, 
stagnating demand, and recession following the oil crisis of 1973 led to decline in 
the steel and shipbuilding industries (Lundberg 1982). The industrial sector 
shrank relative to other parts of the economy. Annual productivity growth, having 
increased at 4.1 percent per year between 1950 and 1973, dropped to 1.4 percent 
thereafter (Forseback 1976). The public sector’s share of GDP rose and the 
number of public sector jobs, increased to maintain the image of full employment, 
came to outnumber those in private industry after 1978 (Gress 1991; OECD 
1992). Lindbeck (1997) argues that sluggish productivity growth was, to some 
extent, the result of the increasing size of public sector.   
By 1976, most economic indicators were pointing downwards. Sweden’s 
unemployment rate averaged 2 percent during the 1970s, double that experienced 
in the 1960s (OECD 1977). “But the maintenance of high employment had been 
accompanied by less favourable performance in other areas, notably costs, prices 
and the balance of payments” (OECD 1977, 42). Inflation was double that of the 
previous decade, with the oil crisis contributing to prices’ upward trajectory. “In 
the 1970s, wages exploded in a self-destructive series of agreements that placed 
Swedish firms in the un-competitive position of having the highest paid labour 
force in the world” (Ahlén 1989, 333). The balance of payments also deteriorated 
sharply (OECD 1976). The economy’s growth slowed to 1 percent in 1976 from 
2.5 percent the previous year before contracting in 1977 (O’Connor, O’Malley, 
and Foley 1978). The government’s purist counter-cyclical fiscal policies resulted 
in the budget deficit expanding significantly (Siven 1984), with the national debt 
tripling within a decade (OECD 1982a).   
 
Extant Ideational Collapse. During the 1970s, elections were dominated by 
concerns over social welfare, employment, taxation, and nuclear power. As the 
1976 general election approached, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, 
Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) noted declining support (Hadenius 
1997). The previous three years had been marked by parliamentary deadlock due 
to a close 1973 election. In 1976, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), proposed a wage earner fund, through a levy 
on corporate profits, to transfer control of enterprises with more than 50 
employees to the unions (Esping-Andersen 1992). However, the SAP retreated 
from the idea due to the opposition of the Swedish Employers’ Federation, 
Svenska Arbetsgivarforening (SAF) (Whyman and Burkitt 1993). The non-
9
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 socialist parties, “at last with an issue around which they could collectively 
mobilise,” argued that the wage earner fund proposal demonstrated the SAP 
wanted state dominance in the business sector, whereas the Swedish model had 
been built on co-operation of both sides of industry with a neutral state (Blyth 
2002, 207). The unions seemed to be moving further to the left, away from an 
accommodation with capitalism and towards outright socialism, while their 
political allies in the SAP were shifting to towards the center.  The SAP was also 
criticised from the left by the Left Party Communists, Vänsterpartiet 
Kommunisterna (VPK), due to unprecedented unrest in the labour market. This 
situation, rife with unfulfilled economic expectations and change agents 
dissatisfied with the prevailing circumstances and paradigm, constituted 
ideational collapse. 
 
The Failure of New Ideational Consolidation. The deadlock in Parliament 
between the 1973 and 1976 elections created political uncertainty, while the three 
non-socialist parties (Centre, Liberal, and Moderate) became more skilled at 
presenting a united front in election campaigns and Parliament (Time 1976b).  
The 1976 election campaign saw the non-socialist parties unite under the 
leadership of Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party (Back et al. 2009). Fälldin 
depicted the SAP government as advocates of an unwieldy, inhumane society that 
accorded higher priority to growth and profitability than to other, more important 
values, such as the environment and individual freedom. Time (1976b) pointed 
out that the growing concentration of state power and fear of the over-
bureaucratisation of society through the wage earner funds were the non-
socialists’ targets. This election, resulting in only small shifts in the relative 
strength of the socialist and non-socialist blocs, saw the defeat of the SAP after 
having ruled Sweden for 44 years (Hinnsfors 2006). The combination of the 
Centre, Liberal, and Moderate parties won a five seat majority in parliament.  
“The Swedish model has gone in for repair,” proclaimed the Financial Times 
(Garme 2001, 133). 
 The discussions surrounding the election and economy did not result in the 
emergence of alternative economic ideas to the existing ones, or a significant 
change agent – a political entrepreneur. The SAF acted as a policy entrepreneur to 
the extent that it sought to stop wage earner funds, but that was all. No other 
significant policy entrepreneurs were present. No political leader was prepared to 
advocate an alternative to, or an end to, social democracy. The non-socialists had 
been out of power for almost half a century, so the last thing they wanted was to 
dismantle the welfare state built up by the LO and SAP, for fear of another half 
century in opposition. Thus, in spite of the dominant economic orthodoxy’s 
failure to meet the challenges of the post oil crises world, the non-socialist parties 
proved both unwilling and unable to create a coalition around alternative ideas to 
10
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 social democracy. They wanted to show the public that the welfare state was safe 
with them. 
 
First Order Policy Change. The SAP’s election defeat only resulted in what could 
best be described as “business as usual” for the welfare state. The new Prime 
Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin, in order to form a coalition out of the non-socialist 
parties, backed away from anything that might generate controversy (Arter 2006). 
For instance, his re-election promise to rapidly dismantle nuclear power plants 
was shelved (Larsson, Letell, and Thörn 2012), as both the Liberals and 
Moderates supported the construction of more such facilities (Time 1976a). Such 
constraints on the ability to implement election promises had severe consequences 
for the government’s lifespan. Ironically, there followed, under the non-socialists, 
an expansion in spending to reanimate the sluggish economy, as well as increases 
in sick pay, funding for child-care centres, and food subsidies (Ginsburg and 
Rosenthal 2002). 
Nevertheless, the employers, encouraged by the SAP’s defeat, launched an 
ideological and political counter-offensive against the trade union movement 
(Whyman and Burkitt 1993). In contrast to the 1930s, the balance of power 
gradually shifted in the SAF’s favour. However, no change to the social 
democratic nature of the state occurred after 1976. When the non-socialists came 
to power they attempted to demonstrate that they were not aiming at counter-
revolution and would not be tampering with the country’s well developed welfare 
system (Childs 2000). Fälldin assured Swedes that he had no intention of 
repealing any of their social benefits, and instead promised to try and better them 
(Hadenius 1997). The new government continued to consult regularly with the 
union movement, and the LO's representation on government committees and 
commissions was the same after 1976 as before. But, Fälldin did interpret the 
election as a mandate to break the concentration of power in the state's 
bureaucracy and to halt experimentation with new social programs.   
The new administration, eager to prove it would not wreck the welfare 
state, took measures to ease the structural problems industry faced. Certain firms 
in difficulty were nationalised while others received subsidies (O’Connor, 
O’Malley and Foley 1978). The support of employment in iron ore, steel, and 
shipbuilding meant preservation of inappropriate structures of production.  
Unemployment also continued to be concealed by expanding public works, 
training programs, and the public sector (Statistisk Arsbok 1982-83). “The results 
were predictable, the budget and external current account went deep into deficit, 
and inflation rose” (Delsen and van Veen 1992, 94). 
 After two years trying to find a solution to Sweden’s nuclear power issues, 
the Fälldin government resigned. It was replaced by a Liberal minority 
government, with Ola Ullsten as prime minister.  This government lasted for just 
11
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 under a year. The 1979 general election saw the non-socialist parties take 49 
percent of the vote and win the election by just one seat. Thorbjorn Fälldin 
returned as prime minister.  However, on many issues the non-socialists remained 
divided (Peterson 1987). Consequently, the coalition could not agree on a set of 
policies to counteract the deteriorating economic situation (Olsen 1984).  Not only 
were they unable to make significant reductions in public expenditure, but their 
rule coincided with a particularly difficult time for the economy.  The irony was 
that the right wing administrations had nationalised and subsidised weak 
industries, something the SAP had resisted (OECD 1978). This failure to improve 
the economy led to disenchantment amongst the electorate.  All the non-socialist 
governments seemed to want was to maintain social democracy by whatever 
means necessary (Callaghan 2000).   
 In this case, economic policy instrument settings changed (first order 
policy change), but the instruments of economic policy, and the goals behind it, 
remained much the same (Hall 1993). Table 1 summarizes the case study’s fit 
with the hypotheses. 
 
Table 1. Empirical Theoretical Fit for Sweden, 1976 
Hypothesis Evaluation 
Hypothesis 1: Crisis to Initiate Debate Concerning Extant Policy Yes 
Hypothesis 2: Ideational Change (Extant Ideational Collapse and New 
Ideational Consolidation) No 
Hypothesis 3: Third Order Policy Change  No 
 
The economic crisis in Sweden failed to generate a significant level of 
debate on alternatives to social democracy. While extant economic policy was 
perceived as failing, change agents did not consolidate around a replacement 
orthodoxy.  This was primarily due to the absence of policy entrepreneurs putting 
forward alternative ideas to social democracy and a political entrepreneur willing 
to champion alternative ideas in the policy making environment (Figure 2).  
Despite an economic crisis, criticisms of social democratic policies and their 
underlying theories, and a change of government from SAP to a liberal coalition, 
this orthodoxy endured. No political party leader, nor party, was willing to take on 
this pillar of Swedish society for fear of electoral suicide. “Apart from disavowing 
wage earner funds, the bourgeois parties offered no real alternative to SAP 
policies” (Blyth 2002, 207).  Ironically, the non-socialist coalitions went further 
than the SAP in supporting industries in difficulty and ultimately failed to adjust 
the expectations of the electorate to Sweden's straitened circumstances (Arter 
2006). 
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 Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
Figure 2. The Absence of Political Entrepreneurs in Sweden, 1976 
 
The United State of America, 1980/1981 
 
The Economic Crisis. The last year of President Carter's administration was 
marked by rising unemployment and high interest rates (OECD 1982b).  
“Washingtonians joked that [Carter] was the first President with poll ratings lower 
than the prime interest rate” (Boller 1996, 355).  The president's implementation 
of the Credit Control Act had the effect of reducing borrowing and putting a 
dampener on economic growth (Hall 2003). By 1980 inflation reached 13.5 
percent, its highest level since 1946, while GDP growth contracted (Mitchell 
1998). The nonpartisan National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), with a 
reputation for declaring when recessions start and finish, announced that the US 
economy was in recession (Time 1980a). The Economic Report of the President 
1981 showed an administration ready to “throw in the towel” on the economy 
(Spulber 1995, 41). There was criticism of Carter’s plans to stimulate the 
economy (Biven 2002). “Too little, too late, too political,” complained Murray 
Weidenbaum of Washington University, providing “the opposite of what the 
ailing economy needs” (Time 1980b, 34).  Teaster (2004) points out that by late 
autumn Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker acknowledged that the economy 
was in recession.  The problem was that the Fed, in tightly controlling the money 
supply, caused interest rates to reach their highest levels in a century. The effect 
was to reduce borrowing and send spending into decline (Weidenbaum 2011).  
Thus, the combined actions of the Federal Reserve and the White House plunged 
the economy into the recession that they had both been trying to avoid (Dark 
First 
Order 
Policy 
Change 
No Political 
Entrepreneur 
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 2001). Volcker's advocacy of a tightened money supply in order to reduce 
inflation constituted a move towards monetarist policy (Krugman 1990).  
However, the American public was very dissatisfied with the government's 
performance.     
 
Extant Ideational Collapse. The president's policies to reduce inflation, intended 
to revive the economy and ensure his re-election, instead contributed to reduced 
consumer borrowing, economic stagnation and his subsequent election defeat 
(Sherman et al. 2008). The news media, such as the Washington Post, began to 
openly declare that the economy was in a serious recession (Hargrove 1988).  
Economists were generally of the opinion that there was little likelihood of an 
economic recovery in the medium term. “The great stagflation swamp” was how 
Walter Okun (1997) termed the situation. Alan Greenspan, a future chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, observed that, as a consequence of the economy's stagnation, 
President Carter found himself forced into an emergency program of restraint, 
leading to a rapid rise in unemployment (Bilhartz and Elliott 2007). A result of 
this situation was that economists, and other policy entrepreneurs, began to 
gradually advocate a paradigm that they believed was capable of correcting the 
problems in the economy: monetarism.   
 Various conservative think tanks, such as the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) – a strong proponent of the free market since the late 1930s, had 
been advocating monetarist ideas, as had economists such as Milton Friedman, 
Karl Brunner of the University of Rochester, Arthur Laffer, Alan Meltzer of 
Carnegie Mellon University, Robert Lucas, and the economic staff of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Blyth 1997; Weidenbaum 2011). Institutions and 
economists of this perspective worked hard to ensure that economic journalism in 
the media, for example in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, served as a 
conduit for their ideas (Blyth 1997). The late 1970s also saw a group of mostly 
Republican Congressmen and staffers advocating what became known as supply 
side economics (Hogan 1990a). With policy entrepreneurs generally in agreement 
as to the inadequacy of the extant paradigm, ideational collapse had occurred.    
 
New Ideational Consolidation. The Republicans nominated Ronald Reagan as 
their candidate for President. Adopting the role of a political entrepreneur, he 
embraced the ideology of the New Right – a cultural conservatism stressing social 
and moral issues, and advocating supply side economics.  His campaign was to be 
change orientated. This was emphasized in a campaign speech in Chicago 
advocating the Kemp-Roth economic formula (Hogan 1990a). He had a simple 
message: low taxes, reduced spending on social services, balanced budgets, and 
fewer government regulations. Advocacy of supply side economics fit particularly 
well with Reagan’s view that the citizens could resolve the country’s problems if 
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 there was less governmental interference in their lives (Wallison 2003).  Reagan 
urged a bold program of tax reductions, spending restraints, and regulatory 
reforms that would inject new life into the economy (Hogan 1990b). Where Barry 
Goldwater had failed in 1964, Reagan was convinced he could triumph in 1980 
(Hirsh 2010). 
Reagan laid the blame for the recession at the door of the president, saying 
that Carter's policies had stifled productivity while increasing both inflation and 
unemployment (Hirsh 2010). Reagan succeeded in building an electoral coalition 
around the concept of monetarism and won the 1980 presidential election on the 
back of advocating a marked set of alternative economic ideas which could used 
to supplant extant arrangements (Blyth 1997). Reagan's election victory, and the 
Republicans’ regaining of control of the Senate for the first time since 1954, were 
seen as providing a mandate for monetarist policies (OECD 1982b). In the midst 
of an economic crisis there was a collapse in confidence in the dominant 
economic orthodoxy. Various economists, think tanks, and other interest groups, 
acting as policy entrepreneurs and advocating monetarist economic ideas, 
consolidated around Reagan in the role of a political entrepreneur. This 
acceptance of monetarism as a viable alternative orthodoxy constituted ideational 
change. 
Several economic, ideological, and social trends contributed to Reagan’s 
appeal. The 1970s witnessed growing middle class opposition to the taxes 
necessary to sustain programs such as social security. This burden became greater 
as the economic depression deepened, leading to a questioning of existing policies 
and their underlying ideas.   
 
Third Order Policy Change. Reagan utilized anti-government sentiment to his 
advantage, emphasizing the importance of individualism and a smaller role for the 
federal government. The monetarist proposals of policy entrepreneur Arthur 
Laffer played a large role in Reagan's economic strategy. For the problem of 
stagflation he promoted a seemingly straightforward remedy: tax cuts, wherein 
the resulting stimulus would boost the federal government's revenues to balance 
the budget, consequently reducing inflationary pressure (Dallek 1984).  Reagan’s 
uncomplicated patriotism acted as a balm to the wounded national psyche.  
However, the victory of New Conservatism was also driven by the challenge to 
America’s economic hegemony by West Germany and Japan (Renshaw 1991). 
President Reagan's new economic program, dubbed Reaganomics by the media, 
was built upon the belief that reductions in regulations and taxes would allow the 
economy to rebound. Thus, new economic policies were drawn along lines that 
were very different from those of preceding governments in their theoretical and 
political origins (OECD 1982b).   
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 The first budget the new president sent to Congress proposed a $750 
billion tax cut, built around a 30 percent reduction in federal income tax over 
three years (Jones 1995). It was bold and original, the largest tax reduction in US 
history (Peterson and Rom 1988). The administration also reduced spending on 
unemployment benefits programs, job training programs, public works and trade 
adjustment assistance benefits by $11 billion (Jones 1995). These were all moves 
advocated by David Stockman at the Office of Management and Budget as a 
means of cutting taxes, increasing defense expenditure, and balancing the budget 
(Peele 1990).  For Stockman this marked a clear break with past policy (Stockman 
1981). Middle and working class Americans, who had organised “tax revolts” 
from Massachusetts to California, applauded this policy (Jones 1995). 
The new administration sought to reduce regulation across the economy 
and towards that end it abolished the Council on Wage and Price Stability (OECD 
1982b). Following Reagan's election, economic policy instrument settings, the 
instruments of economic policy, and the hierarchy of goals behind economic 
policy all changed. This transformation in economic policy endured into the 
administrations of Reagan’s successors. As such, D’Souza (1997) regards 
Reagan’s program for the economy as the most ambitious in the half century 
following the Great Depression.     
Wallison (2003) argues that Reagan, coming as he did with a fully 
developed philosophy of government, represented a set of ideas that reformulated 
Republican policy to tap into traditional American values – private sector based 
economic growth and individual opportunity. In addition to reorienting the GOP, 
he persuaded Americans that there was another way to think about their economy 
and government. This resulted in the radical shift in economic policy that lay at 
the heart of the "Reagan Revolution" (Weatherford and McDonnell 2005). For 
Wallison (2003) this marked a historic turning point in the US, even arguing that 
the Republicans’ 1994 takeover of Congress was largely based on Reagan’s 
enduring ideas. Reagan’s economic policies changed the economic and political 
landscape of 1980s America, and an examination of the 1990s shows that the 
thrust of these policies remained essentially intact over a decade later (Busch 
2005). Table 2 summarizes the case study’s fit with the hypotheses.     
 
Table 2. Empirical Theoretical Fit for the US, 1980/1981 
Hypothesis Evaluation 
Hypothesis 1: Crisis to Initiate Debate Concerning Extant Policy Yes 
Hypothesis 2: Ideational Change (Extant Ideational Collapse and New 
Ideational Consolidation) Yes 
Hypothesis 3: Third Order Policy Change  Yes 
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 A severe economic crisis led policy entrepreneurs and outside influences 
to contest the viability of extant economic policies. These attacks on extant policy 
led to the collapse of the ideas underlying it. In this environment, an 
entrepreneurial network of policy entrepreneurs advocated a replacement set of 
ideas: monetarism. Political entrepreneur Ronald Reagan, willing to promote 
monetarism as an alternative approach to running the economy, managed to 
consolidate the entrepreneurial network advocating this new economic orthodoxy, 
resulting in ideational change. Following Reagan’s election as president he 
implemented a third order change (paradigm shift) (see Figure 3) in macro-
economic policy (Hall 1993). Thus, a macro-economic crisis, the initiation of a 
policy debate, ideational change, and a change of government, all contributed to 
the paradigm shift in economic policy that took place in America after 1981.  
However, the crucial element was Ronald Reagan. Acting as the archetypal 
political entrepreneur, after consolidating policy entrepreneurs around a new 
economic ideational structure, he was willing to champion those ideas once in 
power, injecting them into the political environment. This led directly to a radical 
change in macro-economic policy. 
 
 
 Political Entrepreneur 
 Political Elite 
 Policy Entrepreneur  
Figure 3. The Presence of a Political Entrepreneur in the US, 1980/1981 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper sought to uncover the inner mechanisms of policy change and, 
specifically, how ideas enter the political arena to enact change. We argue that 
Political Entrepreneur: 
Ronald Reagan  
Third 
Order 
Policy 
Change 
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 reliance on exogenous shocks to account for policy change is too simplistic and 
fails to explain the absence of change in the wake of a crisis. The central thesis 
was that the introduction of new ideas into the policy environment, and their 
transformation into policy, was due to the activities of “entrepreneurial networks” 
of policy entrepreneurs, with political entrepreneurs at their head. The 
entrepreneurial network is, as Schumpeter (1934) argued in relation to economic 
entrepreneurs, a vibrant endogenous driver of creative destruction, where new 
policies are formed to replace old and failing ones.  
 The cases examined were Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the start 
of the 1980s.  In each case there was economic crisis, criticisms of existing 
economic policy, resultant policy debates, and changes of government and 
political leaders.  In the case of Sweden, there was no economic ideational 
change, whereas in the US there was. While ideational collapse occurred in 
Sweden, policy entrepreneurs, lacking a political entrepreneur, failed to 
consolidate around a viable alternative idea.  Without ideational change, there was 
only minor policy change. In the US, ideational collapse was followed by 
ideational change and, subsequently, third order policy change, as an 
entrepreneurial network of policy entrepreneurs, all advocating monetarism, 
consolidated around a political entrepreneur in the form of Ronald Reagan. The 
difference between the level of economic policy change in the US on the one hand 
and Sweden on the other was due to the presence of an entrepreneurial network 
and a political entrepreneur. 
 In Sweden, the intermediary necessary to bridge the gap between the ideas 
of policy entrepreneurs and the political institutions was missing. While an 
economic crisis initiated debate on existing economic policies and their 
underlying ideas, this crisis did not result in policy change. Policy change remains 
firmly dependent upon political entrepreneur led entrepreneurial networks 
consolidating around new economic ideas, which the political entrepreneur then 
introduces to the institutional environment. The political entrepreneur is the 
primary and endogenous force responsible for policy change.   
However, a limitation of this paper is that the framework set out here is 
tested within relatively stable political/policy systems, into which political 
entrepreneurs can inject new ideas. An alternative would be to test this framework 
in the context of institutional instability, wherein the political entrepreneur might 
not be an endogenous entity. Such an examination would test the limitations of 
the framework's hypotheses, allowing for their modification and the strengthening 
of the framework.   
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